Images Of Crisis On Television:
National Media Approaches To European Identity-Making

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ABSTRACT

The clash between European and national identities has generated an ongoing debate in the European Union, which usually peaks in times of crises. Such a crisis occurred in June-July 2015 when Greece experienced a fresh culmination of its ongoing financial and socio-political stalemate. The negotiations between the Greek government and the EU administration led to a strain on the banking system, a dividing referendum and social movements in the country, resulting in the national elections of September 2015. Greeks around the world perceived this crisis in multiple ways, but for Greek-Cypriots, it brought forth memories of the 2013 banking crisis (at least). It is of interest to examine the role of national media, and specifically television, in the process of European and national identity making in times of crisis. The aim of the case study is to scrutinize and understand the portrayal of the 2015 Greek crisis as presented to the Cypriot society through the national television channels. Engaging in a qualitative framing analysis, this article investigates the political and social aspects in which the crisis in Greece was portrayed, as well as political problematizations concerning conflicts between the European, Hellenic and Cypriot aspects of the national identity, all or some of which many Greek-Cypriots consciously claim to adopt. As this research indicates, the framing of television news during the crisis was ideologically, rather than ethnically, motivated, while the events precipitated deviations from traditional positions on national identity in all ideological groups of the country. Importantly, this study uncovers a subtle trend to promote a new, European awareness in the national identity, attempting to generate sympathy for this multicultural and multinational community of rival politics and opportunity.

Keywords: European identity-making, television, economic crisis, Greece, Cyprus

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1.   INTRODUCTION

Cultural citizenship and European identity, although scholarly analyzed, are still considered as two contemporary and circulating discourses on the relationship between cultural identity and citizenship (Delgado-Moreira, 1997), especially since the onset of the economic/banking crisis in Europe after 2009. Within the cultural and historical circles of the European Union, there seems to exist a widespread feeling that generating a European identity could be a desirable asset, believed to improve the odds of survival of the multinational and multicultural union. However, the economic crisis, mainly experienced since 2009 in the European south, has raised questions especially among citizens of these member states whether this European identity conflicts with the national identity of every nation state. These questions often lead to social debates concerning identity, especially during peaks of the economic crisis, such as the one that arose in the summer of 2015 in Greece.

In June and July 2015, Greece experienced a fresh culmination of its ongoing financial and socio-political crisis, again affecting all aspects of everyday life for Greeks locally as well as around the world. The negotiations between the Greek government and the EU administration instigated an unprecedented crisis that led to the closure of banks until the negotiations could recommence, a referendum that divided Greeks, social movements in the country and, finally, the national elections of September 2015. An overview of the main events during these negotiations is provided in Table 1. In fact, the latest socio-economic crisis in Greece raised once again the issue of national-versus-European identity, with Greek media around the world perceiving and interpreting the crisis in multiple ways. For Greek-Cypriots, however, not only did it raise these questions, but it also brought up memories of the onset of the banking crisis in Cyprus in March 2013.

Table 1. Overview of the June-July 2015 negotiations between Greece and the EU

Day	Event
28/6:	Emergency Meeting of the European Central Bank
29/6:	Implementation of capital controls on the Greek banks. Submission of the Greek petition for the extension of the economic program.
30/6:	The Greek government announces its disagreement with the European proposals. Eurogroup announces that no further economic help will be available to Greece, if the country will not comply with the EU proposals.
1/7:	Meeting of the International Monetary Fund.
2/7:	The International Monetary Fund announces their review regarding the viability of the Greek national debt.
3/7:	Demonstrations in Greece regarding the Referendum for the EU proposals
5/7:	Referendum
7/7:	European Summit
8/7:	Meeting of the EU Parliament
9/7:	The Greek government submits its proposal for the EU to the Greek Parliament
10/7:	The Parliament votes in favor of the proposal
11/7:	Eurogroup Summit
12/7:	European Summit

The aim of this work is to inspect the portrayal of the 2015 Greek crisis in the Greek-Cypriot television channels, specifically in their main news bulletins. In particular, this paper qualitatively examines the framing used in the news, so as to investigate the political and social aspects used in representing the crisis in Greece, and how these may have led to conflicts between the European, Greek and Cypriot constituents of the Cypriot national identity, some or all of which several Greek-Cypriots consciously claim to adopt. It also attempts to discern if and how the depiction of the Cypriot national identity in the media is evolving with respect to the (relatively new) European reality of the Republic of Cyprus. Although a comparative analysis with the media portrayal of the 2013 Cypriot banking crisis will not be undertaken here, this study looks for implied comparisons with this within the news bulletins.

2.   RATIONALE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

By examining crisis, the public debate on and awareness of a European component to the Cypriot national identity had already started in earnest in Cyprus. It is, therefore, intriguing to investigate what the crisis in Greece would contribute to this debate for various reasons. First, Greece has always held a special place in the Cypriot society (see section 5) with a significant number of Greek-Cypriots considering their Hellenic roots as an integral part of their identity. Second, the neoliberal party, *DISI*, which is numerically the largest political party in Cyprus and had elected and supported the Cypriot government, had been the most vocal political power in embracing the Greek facet in the Cypriot identity. Third, being right-wing, the Cypriot government was more closely affiliated with the political ideology of most European national leaders and most heads of European institutions, rather than the left-wing Greek government of the political party *SIRIZA*. Finally, the Greek-Cypriot political opposition, especially the left-wing *AKEL*, had focused on highlighting the Cypriot ethnicity of the island, but simultaneously were ideologically associated with *SIRIZA*, and opposed to various aspects of the Cypriot bailout plan (e.g., the so-called "austerity measures", "the haircut" of deposits exceeding 100,000 euro, etc.). On principle, they also opposed the memoranda Greece had adopted in previous years. With so many conflicting principles for all the political powers on the island, it was interesting to

explore which aspects of the Cypriot national identity would be most pronounced in the Cypriot media and which side the media, government and political opposition would align themselves with.

Given that the recession in Greece is still ongoing, and that the crisis in the summer of 2015 had lasted over three weeks, a fact which obviously generated significant air time, the subject was narrowed down to three specific research questions:

RQ1: How did the national channels depict the sides of the negotiations, i.e., the Greek delegation and the EU national delegations and institutions?

RQ2: Which of the characteristic(s) of the Cypriot national identity – ideological, nationalistic or European – was drawn upon or promoted in the news stories?

RQ3: Based on these representations, is the portrayal of the Cypriot national identity evolving? If so, how?

3.   IMAGES OF CRISIS ON TELEVISION

Crisis is defined as an unexpected event that overturns the usual functional processes within a society, resulting in an ambiguous and constantly varying situation, the consequences of which are difficult to predict (Coombs, 1999). Crisis involves a condensation of temporality and names within an event of some duration, which is startling and momentous precisely because it demands resolution within a limited period of time (Doane, 1990). A core issue in every crisis is the need of the public for amplified information; in fact, as usually happens in this situation, society shows an increased interest towards information flow, resulting in higher percentages of television viewing of news programs (Maniou, 2013).

Several scholars have contributed to understanding the transformations from a "high-modern" paradigm of news and public information to a "postmodern" age of commercialized televised spectacles (e.g., Eswari, 2014). In the past decade, several issues of public significance have arisen, from the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to the ongoing economic crisis that began in 2008. While societies have needed reporting of critical facts and rational, documented debate, the most influential sources of information (e.g., television news) have provided instead a steady and often debilitating stream of distraction-distortion spectacles (Jones & Baym, 2010).

In crises, information is peculiarly compatible with the apparatus of television: both are fully aligned with the notion of urgency; both thrive on the exhaustion, moment by moment, of their own material; both are hence linked with transience (Doane, 1990). This is likely why television coverage of crisis often presents dramatic or catastrophic images, while the rapid progress of technology enables the concurrent broadcasting of such images globally. One would expect the opposite scenario: new forms of technology can contribute in building new models of releasing real and live crisis information (see, for example, the analysis in Wei et al., 2010). Instead, television coverage of crisis remains largely attached to past models and practices (e.g., breaking news, live correspondences depicting backgrounds of fire exchange in armed conflicts, or fights at massive demonstrations), offering worldwide audiences a constructed reality (Miller, 2006; Tuchman, 1978), so as to gain high percentages in viewing shares. Thus, the negotiation of crisis in the current paradigm of television coverage refers to values and other ethically charged notions, such as democracy, peace, freedom, etc. (Triandafyllidou et al., 2009), depending on the experiences, memories and mentalities of every society, within which television operates.

4.   TOWARDS A EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Identity is a widely controversial term, debated in various academic fields, particularly over philosophical, sociological, political, psychological and several other grounds (Wodak, 2009). Therefore, it is impossible to present a coherent, fair and detailed overview of all the relevant theories in all fields and representing all the premises on which it is discussed. As this work focuses on how the Greek crisis was represented in national television channels viewed by the Greek-Cypriot society, the sociological perspective of identity is adopted. In this, identity refers to the dynamics of self-conception and recognition, concerning the faculty to define oneself both as an individual as well as a member of various groups, and the capability of finding a proper coherence over time (Sciolla, 1983). Since identity deals with the meanings and the social norms that shape and connect individual and social behavior (Scalice, 2015; Chadran & Ariffin, 2015), it is not feasible to talk about a sense of self without referring to relationships with "others" (Crespi, 2004): in other words, our idea of who we are, is often framed as a response to some "other" group (Barth, 1969). People grow up in families and communities, and come to identify within the groups in which they are socially located. Gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality, social class and age have all been the basis of people's main identities (Fligstein et al., 2012).

The concept of collective identity may be seen as an interactive process framed by a given set of rituals, practices and artefacts shared by a society or a group of individuals that feel and act in the same way (Mellucci, 2003). It is socially constructed and refers to the idea that a group of people accept (at least) a fundamental and consequential similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves (Thernborn, 1995; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000).

Accordingly, the concept of national identity can be viewed in collective terms, as one's sense of belonging to a nation or a state. As such, it can be represented by distinctive traditions, language, religion, culture, ethnic symbols and even music, products and cuisine (Ashmore et al., 2001; Guibernau, 2004; Lazlo, 2013; Tajifel & Turner, 1986). The literature on national identities tends to distinguish two ideal types of nationalism: civic and ethnic (Brubaker, 1992; Eisenstadt & Geisen, 1995; Kohn, 1944; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). Civic forms of national identity tend to focus on citizenship as a legal status obtainable by anyone willing to accept a particular legal, political and social system (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). Ethnic forms of nationalism require that people adhere to national culture when having been born into it. Ethnic nationalism focuses on how common religion, language, national traditions, ancestry and membership

in a dominant ethnic or racial group form the bases for national membership. While both civic and ethnic conceptions of nationalism imply that a person has one and only one national identity, the civic conception allows that people who were not born and raised in a particular nation to partake of that national identity (Fligstein et al, 2012). The notion of a European identity, widely analyzed in various fields and controversially debated among their scholars, is perceived today more as a necessity for a stable future of the EU and less as a collective reality (Kun, 2015). However, is there in fact a European identity? On the one hand, some scholars argue that European history and civilization comprise a cultural heritage in which all Europeans can recognize themselves (Morin, 1987; Passerini, 1998). On the other hand, others point out that there is such variety of national traditions, norms and values, which are so different and, at times, even contrasting, that it is not possible to point to a single European identity (Crouc, 1999; Mendras, 1997; Scalice, 2015). Fligstein (2008, p. 124) argues that "when applying the model of national identity formation to the possibility of the emergence of a European identity, one has already bought into the notion that the endpoint of European economic integration is to produce a nation-state. This idea is currently at dispute in Europe, among not only political elites but also the citizens."

Although it remains difficult to understand the subjective conception of identity, by using quantitative tools some indicative findings suggest that citizens of the member states tend to show increasing absence of trust towards the EU, especially after 2010 in the countries of the European south (Standard Eurobarometer, 2013). Most of these findings are attributed to the rapidly growing economical divide between the north and the south, although this characteristic seemed evident even before the onset of the economic crisis. For example, new forms of distribution of economic, cultural and social capital in Europe (Kauppi, 2003) affected several territories, resulting in new forms of inequality and social divide which Europeans experience in their daily life (Leonardi, 2012), and which influence the construction of their sense of belonging (Scalice, 2015).

5.   BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:
THE CYPRIOT NATIONAL IDENTITY

The Republic of Cyprus is an island nation in the east Mediterranean Sea and the majority of its population is of Greek descent, with other large ethnic groups including Cypriots of Turkish, Armenian, Latin and other Christian Catholic origins[1], as well as large communities of European and non-European citizens.

The island was divided in 1974 following a Greek-backed coup against the President, which led to the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish military forces, their occupation of the northern half of the island and the splitting of the population with most Turkish-

Cypriots in the north and the Greek-Cypriots and remaining minorities in the south. The Greek-Cypriot community is frequently concerned with and affected by the social, political and financial changes in Greece, due to their affiliation with the Greek language and their shared history and religion (Maniou & Photiou, 2017; Maniou et. al, 2017).

Most social, economic and/or political patterns of behavior in the Republic of Cyprus were linked, after 1974, to the main political problem of the country, the Turkish military occupation of northern Cyprus. Attempts to solve this usually evolve around the crucial issue of ethnic identity, which seems to be of paramount importance at least for the Greek-Cypriot community. However, there exist three competing notions in the way most Greek-Cypriots perceive their ethnic/national identity. *Hellenocentrism*, which emphasizes their perception of themselves principally as Greeks, has been mainly supported by the political right (*DISI*) and center parties (*DIKO, EDEK*) in this community. *Cypriocentrism* – highlighting the Cypriot ethno-cultural and legal, political roots, which the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities share – has been mainly supported by the left-wing party *AKEL* (Philippou, 2009, Spyrou, 2001). More recently, Pachoulides (2007) has identified a third notion, that of *Hellenocypriocentrism*, which represents Cyprus as a mono-cultural state inhabited by citizens of Greek origin and of Greek-Orthodox religion. An ethnocentric approach by Mavratsas (2012, p. 112) points out that "the Greek-Cypriot political culture seemingly presents an almost unbelievable introversion, remaining oriented in a traditional and obsolete ethos, from which concepts like 'citizen', 'multicultural democracy' and 'contemporary state' are absolutely absent." All these characteristics are explicitly depicted in Greek-Cypriot television (Maniou, 2013), since there is a strong interrelation between television and national identity in every country (Madianou, 2007).

Adding to all these ethnographic characteristics, the country's accession to the EU in 2004 initiated the public debate on (the perception and even adoption of) a European identity, an issue widely discussed especially after the banking crisis of 2013. The rapid growth of the financial sector in previous years, led the Eurogroup to reach, in March 2013, an unprecedented decision regarding the Cypriot economic crisis (already evident since 2011)[2]. It imposed a haircut on deposits above 100,000 euro, suggested a bailout plan that was in no small part financed by the country's own resources, and was accompanied by austerity measures, which, together with the banking and national debts, decisively affected all aspects of the local society (political, economic, social, cultural, etc.) (Charalambous, 2014).

As expected, anti-European emotions were raised, mainly against Germans and the welfare nations of the north (often referred to as "others" in the media), and trust towards European institutions dramatically dropped since 2013, reaching 37%, after being raised by 6%, in Spring 2014 (Standard Eurobarometer, 2014). Protests against austerity measures in Greece and other countries of the south found a new

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[1]   Although statistics regarding the ethnicity of the population in Cyprus have been a bit sketchy since 1974, at that time it was estimated that 85% of the population were of Greek-Cypriot origin, 12% were Turkish-Cypriots, and the Armenian, Latin and other Catholic groups comprised the remaining 3% of the population (PIO, 2000, p.50).

[2]   It is not the goal of this paper to analyze the political and economic reasons that led to the banking crisis of 2013, or to provide an in-depth examination of how it occurred.

ally in a majority of Greek-Cypriots, who attributed their anti-European emotions to the argument that these nations were carrying all of Europe, instead of sharing in a partnership (Fligstein et al., 2012).

6.   BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW OF TELEVISION IN CYPRUS

This research investigates the portrayal of the 2015 Greek crisis in four Greek-Cypriot television channels, namely *RIK*, *Sigma*, *Ant1* and *Mega*, selected specifically as the only four national channels at that time, which broadcast news bulletins in their program. Some historical background on these is necessary.

Public service television in Cyprus was established in 1957, under the auspices and guidance of the British Broadcasting Corporation (*BBC*). In 1959, the Cyprus Broadcasting Service ceased to be a governmental department and, although maintaining its financial backing from the newly instated Cypriot government, it was renamed the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation under the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation Act 300A[3]. For thirty-five years, this public television channel, *RIK* (*CyBC*), was the only broadcasting sector in the country.

It was only in 1992 that private television channels were allowed to operate, under the auspices of Law 29 (1) 1992, and *RIK* was renamed as *RIK1*. The first private station introduced in Cyprus in 1992 was *Logos* and its main shareholder was the Greek-Orthodox (Cypriot) Church. Later, this was leased by private shareholders of the Greek TV station *Mega* and renamed as *Mega Cyprus* and today as *MEGAONE*. The channel *Ant1* was established shortly afterwards; this is a daughter company of the *Ant1* media group and is partly owned by *Ant1 Cyprus* media group and by the Greek media group of *Ant1*. In 1995, the *Sigma TV* station, part of a larger, vertically-integrated media organization known as *DIAS*, began broadcasting nationally (Nicholi, 2014; PRIO group, 2010). General data (*SHR*) from the summer of 2015 regarding the viewership of the four national channels in order of decreasing rates include: *Mega* 18.1%, *Ant1* 15.2%, *Sigma* 13.8% and *RIK1* 13.4%[4].

7.   MEDIA FRAMES: CONSTRUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND ANALYSIS

7.1   Theoretical Framework: Construction and Consumption of Media Frames

This study uses framing analysis to examine the representation of the summer 2015 Greek crisis in the main news bulletins of the four Greek-Cypriot television channels with nation-wide news broadcasting. Framing as a concept originated in cognitive psychology (Bartlett, 1932; van Gorp, 2007) and anthropology (Bateson, 1955/1972), but has subsequently been used in many fields of the social sciences and humanities, including sociology (e.g., Goffman, 1974), linguistics (e.g., Tannen, 1979) and communication science (e.g., Tuchman, 1978). The appreciation of what constitutes a frame has been changed to fit the needs of each discipline and the work of specific researchers, thereby inhibiting consensus on a single rigorous definition (e.g., Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).

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3   http://www.hellenicaworld.com/Cyprus/TVRadio/en/CyprusBroadcastingCorporation.html.
4   Based on AGB Nielsen Cyprus data, 2015 (Telebarometer for Cyprus, 2015).

Nevertheless, most researchers agree that in order to communicate actions and/or events to a specific community, especially through television, frames are used to enable individuals to interpret and evaluate them in (possibly multiple but not limitless) shared ways and to discuss them within these socially endorsed constraints (van Gorp, 2005; van Gorp, 2007; Tuchman, 1978). Specifically, frames can condense complicated or excessive information to the level of understanding of the journalist and audience, as well as the allowed space or time of a publication or broadcast, thereby constituting essential tools in reporting (Gans, 1979; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Here, the view is adopted that a frame may be any conceptual tool or abstraction that enables media and their audiences to communicate, decode and appraise information by choosing and/or highlighting some of their aspects and downplaying or omitting others (Gitlin, 1980; Neuman et al., 1992; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).

Framing the news, however, results in audiences receiving them in edited (as opposed to raw) form. Choosing, coding and decoding framing devices depends equally on the cognition of the source, communicator and recipient(s) of the information and on their shared cultural experiences and knowledge, which enables all participants to select specific (but multiple possible) meanings for them (Goffman, 1974; Gamson et al., 1992). The production of the news story is the first part of the communication process. During this stage, first the source and then the communicator select to focus on "some aspects of a perceived reality" while partly or completely eliminating others, thus promoting "a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (Entman, 1993, p. 52; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011, p. 105). As such, framing comprises an integral stratagem in establishing at least five types of interests of the source(s) and/or communicator(s): socially established morals and ideals, financial and internal (administrative) concerns of media organizations, pressures applied by specific elites, the data-collecting and processing practices of each professional, and their ideological or political affiliations (Scheufele, 1999, p. 109). The process of *frame building*, therefore, occurs "in a continuous interaction" between the professionals that broadcast the news and the elites and/or social movements that have any (political, social, financial, etc.) stakes in them (de Vreese, 2005, p. 52).

The second part of the communication process, the consumption of the news, occurs through the interaction between the media and their audiences. In the process of *frame setting*, the (social, cultural and/or other relevant) knowledge and personality traits of individuals engage in order to interpret the media frames in specific ways. Multiple possible outcomes may result from this, and not necessarily the ones desired by the producers of the frames. However many, the interpretations are not limitless, given the common socio-cultural background of the audiences with the sources and communicators (e.g., de Vreese, 2005).

7.2   Framing Analysis of Television News

Due to their wide applicability and range of effects, media frames – and in particular those used in television news – have been analyzed with a variety of foci, quantitatively

as well as qualitatively. Two categories of frames have been defined in the investigation of television news: issue-specific (or thematic) and generic (de Vreese, 2005). In the former category, frames relate to and are (gradually) developed to communicate information within a particular (usually long-lasting and socially significant) issue. Conversely, generic frames are repeated in various types of news (e.g., political, financial, criminal, humanitarian, etc.) and are thus known *a-priori*. Such frames highlight one of at least five aspects of an event: "conflict", "human interest", "attribution of responsibility", "morality" and "economic consequences" (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; de Vreese, 2005)[5]. Both categories have been studied as both dependent and independent research variables. Specifically, when the research interest lies in the background processes and the specific interests that lead to their selection in production and during consumption, they are considered dependent. Conversely, they are taken as independent if the research interest lies in the way(s) they affect the audience attitude(s) relative to the reported issue (Scheufele, 1999; de Vreese, 2005).

Quantitative studies use a variety of processes in order to determine and examine television frames and their consequences on the interpretation of the news. Some researchers (e.g., Iyengar, 1996; de Vreese, 2004) have used experimental methods in which a sample of (paid) individuals are exposed to various stories of television news, modified in various ways so as to isolate and change the frames themselves (making them variables of the investigation). After watching the stories, these persons are interviewed and/or they fill in questionnaires to discern their interpretations of the events and how these may have been affected by differences in the frames. Other researchers (e.g., Mendelsohn, 1993) conducted interviews with news professionals and/or audiences, which focused on their understanding of actual news stories presented in TV news. Finally, another group (e.g., Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) conducted comparative content analysis with a focus on the devices pertaining to particular generic frames. In all these studies, results are statically analyzed[6] to gauge the consequences of the specific frames on the comprehension of their audiences.

Qualitative analysis of TV frames has also been utilized in various studies (e.g., Avraham & First, 2010; Lazitski, 2014). In most cases, a qualitative analysis of the discourse and images of the news stories is undertaken, scanning devices for patterns, which are then linked to the frames identified. Often the specific interests, which lead to the production of these frames, are explored in these investigations. Qualitative studies may be inductive, in which the analysis is engaged without *a-priori* expectations of the frames that will be encountered, or deductive, in which the reverse occurs. By contrast, quantitative studies are almost exclusively deductive.

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[5]   Another method of studying generic frames, and specifically strategically framed news coverage, was introduced by Capella & Jamieson (1997). However, as it pertains to the coverage of politics, and particularly election campaigns, it will not be discussed here.

[6]   A description of and discussion on the specific analysis codes used by various authors is not in the scope of this paper, given that the work here is qualitative (see §7.3).

8.   METHOD

An inductive qualitative framing analysis was performed on the main news bulletins of the four national television channels which include such bulletins in their program (*RIK*, *Sigma*, *Ant1* and *Mega*), focusing on their depiction of the 2015 Greek crisis. The two weeks between 28 June and 12 July 2015 were examined, during which the Greek banks remained closed and the negotiations between Greece and the EU took place (see Table 1). Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the total number of news items and airtime analyzed per channel, and their breakdown by date, respectively. All types of news items were inspected, namely reportages, live broadcasts and in-studio interviews. There was no discrimination against the origin of the items; i.e., those produced by the channels themselves or borrowed from their parent companies or collaborators in Greece were equally considered, since the selection to broadcast such items also speaks to how the crisis was chosen to be delineated.

Table 2. Total Sample

TV Channels	RIK	MEGA TV	ANT1 TV	SIGMA TV
Number of reportages	159	144	112	100
Total duration	517 minutes	518 minutes	438 minutes	495 minutes

Table 3. Sample per TV Channel/Minutes Duration

Day	RIK	MEGA TV	ANT1 TV	SIGMA TV
28.06.2015	47	32	42	40
29.06.2015	40	35	35	45
30.06.2015	36	40	35	40
01.07.2015	31	40	32	38
02.07.2015	30	40	35	30
03.07.2015	33	35	35	30
04.07.2015	30	38	20	32
05.07.2015	31	40	23	20
06.07.2015	49	52	38	39
07.07.2015	33	36	33	28
08.07.2015	43	24	19	44
09.07.2015	20	19	14	31
10.07.2015	25	24	21	29
11.07.2015	36	26	19	23
12.07.2015	33	37	37	27

In order to reflect on RQ1, various framing devices, illustrated in Table 4 (first column), were inspected (e.g., Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996; Schudson, 1995; Tankard, 2001; van Gorp, 2005). Importantly, during the analysis, the actual facts being conveyed were not considered, but only the manner(s) in which they were portrayed in order to lead to specific interpretation(s) of the events. The qualitative analysis of these devices followed the scheme illustrated in Table 4. Specifically, the manifest meaning of the details illustrated in the second column of Table 4 was examined for each of the devices. Interpretations for each detail are shown in the final column. In particular, the characterization of individuals and/or groups was taken as an effort to distinguish the crisis into two separate camps, while the use of militant and/or polarizing terms (by the players themselves or the journalists and experts employed in the news bulletins) and images were interpreted as aiming to exhibit conflict between them. Furthermore, the use of dramatic language and imagery was decoded as an effort to imbue a humanitarian aspect in the stories, while any direct or implied accusation of individual(s) and/or group(s) was considered an assignation of (political) blame. Given the nature of the crisis, we took monetary images to exhibit either a flow of wealth or a bleak financial consequence depending on use. Detailed examples are examined in the analysis (section 8). This process enabled patterns of discourse to be discerned, leading to the determination of (at least) one (issue-specific) frame.

Table 4. Framing Devices, Analysis and Interpretations

Device	Detail detected	Meaning ascribed
Titles, images, captions, voiceovers, contrasts between and within stories, introduction of stories, sequence of stories, construction of stories (to lead to specific interpretations), commentaries of presenters/reporters (prior, during and/or after reportages)	Characterization of individual(s) and/or groups, positively, neutrally and/or negatively.	Distinction into (at least) two camps: Positive portrayals interpreted as "heroic" side(s) ("Us"). Negative depictions interpreted as "villainous" camp(s) ("Them").
	Militant and/or polarizing language and images.	Conflict between sides.
	Dramatic language and images.	Humanitarian aspect in crisis.
	Direct or implied accusations.	Assignation of responsibility.
	Monetary images and/or language.	Affluence or impoverishment.

In response to RQ2 and RQ3, the latent meanings of the devices outlined in Table 4 were considered, as well as prior knowledge of the realities of Cypriot identity and identity-making (see section 5). Specifically, the authors considered the latent meanings of the portrayal of the crisis in order to identify (for RQ2) the possible interest(s) – ideological, nationalistic, European – that were furthered from generating the representations identified in RQ1 and the television frame within which actors were portrayed as interacting. These were then compared with the identity-making efforts of various elites and the media themselves in the past, which enabled the investigation (for RQ3) of the evolution or stagnancy of some of the key aspects of the Cypriot national identity.

As discussed above, this work aims to investigate the interests (ideological, social, nationalistic, or other) that led to the production of the specific frame(s) and how they (can be used to) color the Cypriot national identity. Since this is new territory in the study of Cypriot identity-making and its media depiction, generic frames did not apply here. As van Gorp & Vercruysse (2012, p. 1275) suggest, an inductive method is (at least initially) suitable to determine such "general interpretative frame packages", since it can be used to study the construction of the frame(s) rather than their effect(s) on audiences. Nevertheless, the authors recognize that inductive methods have certain drawbacks. One of these is that their conclusions rely on small samples and are not readily reproducible (de Vreese, 2005). It is also possible for other researchers to interpret these news frames in different ways, despite the fact that they may have similar socio-cultural background. Since this is a new area of investigation, it is precisely this multiplicity of interpretations that should be developed first, in order to identify any generic frames in the Cypriot media.

9.   ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: IDENTITY MAKING ON CYPRIOT TELEVISION

This exploration of the representations of the Greek crisis on national Cypriot television begins on the first day that the banks remained closed, i.e., 28 June 2015 (see Table 1). As the discussion below will illustrate, due to the surge of information during the turmoil of events, the reporting of news draws on various, often contradictory, components in the identity of the Greek-Cypriot audience, from their (frequently deep-seated) Hellenic nationalism to an evident affinity towards their European reality (see section 5). Although these often remained only undercurrents in the journalistic discourse, they were deciphered into at least one issue-specific frame, which is referred to here as the frame of "us versus them" (see below; also Maniou & Photiou, 2017). The following sections describe the analysis which has led to this conclusion and discuss its implications in Cypriot identity-making.

9.1   Perplexed Representations: Who is the Antagonist against the People of Greece?
At the end of June 2015, the negotiations between the (then new) Greek government and its Eurogroup partners unraveled quite quickly (within a few hours) and the Greek delegation returned to Athens abruptly, declaring they would be going forward

with the referendum (on whether to accept the EU offer for bailing out the Greek economy). These two events had two effects in the media covering the onset of the Greek crisis. First, it generated a surge of information from multiple sources, which at best failed to corroborate each other, while at worst were frequently conflicting. The failure of the negotiations was clearly considered in the media as a poor outcome, and it was expected to have dire "aftershocks" on the Greek public, but it was unclear over a span of days as to what the consequences might be. Significantly, and this is the second effect it had on the Cypriot media, there was no clear picture as to where the blame lay for it.

That the breakdown of the negotiations was considered an adverse outcome for the Greek public is testified in the manifest evidence of multiple reportages. For example, on 28 June 2015, the main news bulletin on the public channel (*RIK*) begins with the presenter's comment, "The Greek economy is on the razor's edge" (Constantinou, 2015, 20:03:15), a phrase which implies that the situation is critical and can lead to devastation. This comment followed a screen which featured a newspaper image displaying the Greek Prime Minister and entitled "Euro or Drachma", thereby latently introducing a dramatic element to the representation of the economy on said razor's edge. Notably, all three private television channels have similar dramatic commentary throughout the week; since considerations of space make it impossible to analyze all these devices here, the one from *RIK* has been used as an example.

In fact, all four channels use imagery to encase their reportages of the adverse social effects of the crisis. For example, on 28 June 2015, *Mega* begins such a reportage on a demonstration in Cyprus, with the presenter's comment "Cypriots demonstrate in support of the burdened Greek people" (Symeou, 2015b, 20:50:15) , thereby illustrating that even (a portion of) the Cypriot public perceives the consequences of the failed negotiation as dire. Similarly, on 1 July, *RIK* presents images of queues of elderly citizens at ATMs and banks, gas stations and supermarkets, which the correspondent refers to as "images of shame", and which are accompanied by the title "Shocking images circle the globe", (Papathanasiou, 2015, 20:04:35) thus latently elevating the social effects of the failed negotiations to a dramatic humanitarian crisis.

The other two private channels, *Ant1* and *Sigma*, not only display similar images during the week leading up to the referendum (and throughout the period in which the banks remained closed), but also frequently comment on these in the news. For example, on 3 July 2015, *Ant1* describes the end of the parliamentary discussion on the referendum, but links it to the seemingly unconnected comment that "the problems arising from the closed banks have become gigantic and the tribulation of the citizens continues" (Ioannou, 2015c, 20:27:41). On 1 July 2015, the presenter of the *Sigma* main news bulletin comments that "Greece is playing its last cards in the Eurogroup" and that it is "sinking further and further into chaos" (Tsouroulis, 2015, 20:35:37) while presenting reportages on food shortages in supermarkets and tourist cancellations at Greek hotels. As in the other channels, all the manifest evidence serves to paint a bleak picture for the new crisis that has befallen the Greek people, thereby latently presenting them as victims, and as such, a sympathetic side. Nevertheless, the apparent

consensus in presenting the onset of the crisis as a humanitarian case generates a problematization on the intensity of the depiction (see below): were the actual events as dire as presented or were they overly dramatized (due to some underlying cultural tendency for the dramatic and/or the pursuit of higher ratings)?

Although the Greek people were latently delineated as victims, there was a conspicuous absence of clear attribution of political blame for the failure of the negotiations, at least during the first few days into the crisis. Arguably, the media demonstrated confusion on this issue: responsibility was interchangeably attributed to the Greek government, the German delegation with its supporting countries, the European institutions and the IMF, often in the space of a single news bulletin. Specifically, on 28 June 2015, *Ant1* reports the closure of the banks and the implementation of capital controls in Greece with the comment that this was "due to the decision of the European Central Bank to freeze liquidity via the ELA" (Ioannou, 2015a, 20:22:10), thereby placing the blame on said institution. In the same news bulletin, however, the President of the European Commission (Jean-Claude Juncker) reportedly publicized the text of the proposed European position in the negotiations, which appeared in contradiction to the one the Greek Prime Minister had published as the proposal by the institutions, before leaving the negotiations. Reporting this story is not problematic, but the commentary called it a "bomb by Juncker" (Anon, 2015, 20:28:30) manifestly emphasizing its shock effect and thus latently its newsworthiness and dependability, thereby muddling the identification of the antagonist. On 3 July 2015, the same channel reports the end of the pro-yes/no campaigns for the referendum in dramatic, but politically neutral, framing devices (journalistic discourse, images, on-screen text), picking up the "dividing climate" the campaigns have caused within the public, but avoiding to present either the Greek government or its opposition in any heroic or antagonistic hue.

Mega and *Sigma* both report the news in a similarly contradictory manner during this week. For example, on 28 June 2015, the presenter of the *Mega* news bulletin reports the closing of the banks with the comment that the liquidity has not increased in order for the EU to "put pressure on Athens" (Symeou, 2015a, 20:23:47), directly placing the blame on the institutions. Nevertheless, a few days later (1 July 2015), the comment that "the Prime Minister is insisting 'no' on the referendum, while the citizens are sighing at the counters of the banks" (Dimtsa, 2015, 20:27:25) seems to establish a link between Alexis Tsipras and the current dramatic state of the Greek people. Furthermore, on 28 June 2015, a presenter of the *Sigma* news and the correspondent of the channel in Brussels exhibit conflicting positions in their own evaluations of the crisis. The former calls the desire by Juncker to address the Greek people "a clear intervention on the internal affairs of Greece" (Alexandrinou, 2015, 20:49:25), while the latter voices his disbelief on whether an ultimatum was presented to Greece in accepting the European positions during the negotiations (Charalambides, 2015, 20:49:45). It is clear that on various instances, even the journalistic community is in disagreement over the political blame for the failure of the negotiations.

Being the state-backed television channel, *RIK* is responsible to follow a neutral line

in reporting the news. This was followed to the letter, as events and announcements by all sides involved in the Greek crisis were broadcast in neither combatant nor empathetic tones. For example, on the day before the referendum (4 July 2015), the news bulletin reported on the meeting of the pro-yes/no campaigns in Athens the previous night. The presenter commented that "two seas of people with differing positions met in the center of Athens last night" and that "the Greek citizens are deeply divided" with some favoring "staying on the European course of the country, while others want the country to change directions" (Charalambous, 2015, 20:07:40). Despite the gravity of the events and the dramatic, historically heavy language of the reportage, it is clear that favorites are not picked in the referendum.

In itself, the non-positioning of the news in favor of or against protagonists of events is considered to be a respected practice, upholding the principles of watchdog journalism, the value of which resides in creating middle ground for social debate, in which certain facts must be considered by citizens in arriving at their vision of governance (Hunter & van Wassenhove, 2010). However, the ethics of Cypriot journalists are not in question here; rather, the reasons prompting the confusion of the Cypriot media in "picking" antagonist(s) over the Greek crisis, despite obvious attempts to do so, must be examined. All private national television channels favor the ideological right and while *RIK* is mandated to remain politically neutral, it also has to promote government policy; the government in Cyprus is neoliberal. Most nations in the EU and most European institutions are also led by right-wing politicians. At the same time, however, the right-wing in Cyprus has traditionally been most vocal in expressing Hellenic nationalism (Philippou, 2009; Spyrou, 2001; see also section 5). Thus, perhaps ironically, the crisis in Greece put the Cypriot television channels in the difficult position of having to select between promoting two contradicting, yet significant, aspects of identity-making: their ideological affiliation and their (Hellenic) nationalistic sentiments. This choice was significantly exacerbated by the fact that the government in Greece is left-wing. Therefore, the motives for the confusion of the television channels in selecting the antagonists of the Greek people are possibly ideological and result from their reluctance to openly confront the European right-wing in favor of a left-wing government, even if, as a norm, Greece has the unequivocal support of (a large number of) Greek-Cypriots.

9.2   Frame of "Us Versus Them": European Representations and Political Ideology

The European Union is led primarily by right-wing politicians, the ideological affiliation of whom is shared by the private television channels in Cyprus and coincides with the political alignment of the Cypriot government that the state-owned channel must promote. Perhaps for this reason, the representations of European policies and political delegations in the news are not overtly confrontational. In fact, in this work it is found that, while reporting the Greek crisis, the news emphasizes the collaboration of the Cypriot government with the European institutions, promoting the claims of the former that it has led to positive outcomes for the economy of the island. Arguably, this is an effort of the four channels investigated here, possibly on behalf of

the Cypriot government, to ensure that (most of) the Greek-Cypriot public retains a positive view of the EU, despite their possible hellenocentric sentiments. The converse is true regarding the political opposition; specifically, the left-wing party seems much more vocal in its support of the Greek government than would be expected by its low emphasis on Greek ethnicity, a consequence of their shared left ideologies. Thus, the positive representation of the collaboration of the Cypriot government and the European institutions, as well as the reporting of the positions of the political opposition, lead to the conclusion that the evaluation of the crisis by the political powers of Cyprus, as well as its broadcasting, was driven by ideological motivation.

On 28 June 2015, Giorgos Vasiliou was invited for an interview at the studio of *Ant1* during the main news bulletin. Mr. Vasiliou was President of the Republic of Cyprus (1988-1993), elected on the *AKEL* vote. He was the President who filed the application of Cyprus for admission to the European Union, and during the 10 years after his term (1993-2003) was one of the main negotiators during the accession talks. In the *Ant1* studio, he declared, "It is unthinkable for Greece to confront Europe … How can we want to teach the Europeans?" (Vasiliou, 2015a, 20:45). This statement indicates that the opinion Mr. Vasiliou has for Greek politicians and economists is clearly lower than their European colleagues, which is why he considers the attempt to negotiate a presumption on behalf of the Greek delegation. Mr. Vasiliou was the first public figure who manifestly blamed the Greek government for the crisis when the reporter asked him whether he considered the treatment Greece received fair and proper for an equal member of the EU, he responded "… the [Greek] government managed to create a united front against it" (Vasiliou, 2015b, 20:46:20). There is also a significant implication in this statement: if the Greek delegation were non-confrontational, but willing to cooperate with their European colleagues, the united European front would not have been created, and the crisis possibly could have been averted.

Mr. Vasiliou's statements, which emphasized the need for collaboration of indebted EU members with their European colleagues and institutions, were echoed in various ways in all television channels for most of the second week of the crisis. For example, on 3 July 2015 and with the ongoing crisis in Greece, the presenter of *Ant1* started the main news bulletin with the statement, "Rapid developments in Greece, but we will begin our bulletin with something different. Today, the Central Bank of Cyprus has received the green light from the European Stability Mechanism to go ahead with the purchase of Cypriot bonds from the secondary market… Our correspondent has more about this pleasant development" (Ioannou, 2015b, 20:26:07). Although the statement manifestly recognizes the significance of the ongoing Greek crisis, it diverts attention to a perceived positive development in the Cypriot economy. The employment of this distraction technique, the choice to follow this story before the crisis in Greece (thereby attributing it with more significance), and encompassing it with positive adjectives, leads to the deduction that it is used as an example of the benefits gained by collaborating with the EU. Later in the same bulletin, the President of Cyprus is reported as pointing out that the government took advantage of the terms of the loan, resulting in "the total restoration of the reliability of the country and its fiscal

system" (Fesias, 2015, 20:42:40). The carefully selected words in this statement paint the picture of an organized and driven government, which cooperated with its lenders and has reached significant achievements. The failure of journalists to question it (if only to verify his claims numerically), indicates that this is promoted as a positive development in the Cypriot economy. That is, the example of the Cypriot government, delineated in contrast to that of their Greek colleagues, is used in the news to highlight the perquisites of this collaboration.

After the first days of the crisis, the manifest statements of Cypriot government officials presented in all television channels followed a similar latent reasoning, highlighting the advantages of collaboration. For example, on 4 July 2015, *RIK* presented the above story in similar language (e.g., positive descriptors) and displaying images of Euro coins flowing through a counting machine (Iosif, 2015, 20:38:05). The combined verbal and non-verbal communication imply that the problems for the Cypriot economy will soon be over and money will flow back to the island, now that the government is collaborating with its European partners. Moreover, on 3 July 2015, *Mega* hosted the Cypriot Minister of Finance, Harris Georgiades in the ensuing interview, and he refers to the purchase of the Cypriot bonds as an event that "bolsters our economy" and claims that there are mechanisms that can do so for "European economies and now for Cyprus" (Georgiades, 2015, 20:57:20). In addition to referencing the gains for Cyprus directly, the word "now" is key here; it implies that Cyprus, unlike Greece, is included in the beneficiary countries because it cooperated (even played nice?) with the European institutions. On 6 July 2015, after the Greek Prime Minister won the referendum and decided to return to the negotiations, Mr. Dimitris Georgiades (President of Fiscal Board) was asked on *Sigma* regarding the continuation of the liquidity by the ELA. He was reported as saying, "We saw in our own case [Cypriot crisis in March-April 2013], that once the will was there to save the banks, the ELA continued giving liquidity" (Georgiades, 2015, 21:12:25). Thus, the European institutions are represented as benevolent and willing to help their European partners in need, when the latter are also willing to cooperate.

Given all the above examples, the authors argue that Cypriot television represented the EU and its institutions, as well as their collaboration with the Cypriot government, in a consistently positive light, thereby also contrasting it with the delineation of the Greek government as non-cooperative. The implication of this is that finally the antagonists have been identified: they are, in fact, the Greek delegation, with their initial unwillingness to collaborate, although the news did not typically represent them in this light explicitly. Therefore, a distinctive frame is present in the reporting of the 2015 Greek crisis, a frame of a sympathetic "camp" – that of the Greek people and (even) the EU delegates who want to collaborate in rescuing the Greek economy – in dispute with the antagonistic one alluded to in the media. This frame of "us versus them" arguably comprises aspects from (at least) three generic ones: there is a manifest conflict (between the rival sides), a human-interest perspective, and now even latent attribution of responsibility (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; see section 7.2). This is not the first time this frame was encountered in the Cypriot media; it was also used

to frame the depiction of the onset of the 2013 Cypriot banking crisis (Maniou & Photiou, 2017). It is thus necessary to speculate on its recurrence: is it a mechanism to increase media sales, a journalistic routine which practitioners are unwilling or unable to change, or a culturally induced tendency to adopt a dramatic viewpoint?

It is not the aim of this work to examine the effects of the frame of "us versus them" on the Cypriot public, but rather to investigate the interests which have led to the selection of the "us" and "them" sides. It seems counter-intuitive that the Greek side would be blamed so, for two reasons. First, since a significant number of Greek-Cypriots perceive their Hellenic roots of considerable importance to their own identity (Philippou, 2009; Spyrou, 2001), representing the Greek side as the villains would possibly alienate the audience. Second, during the onset of the Cypriot banking and economic crisis in 2013, the Cypriot media depicted the European delegations and institutions as antagonists of the Cypriot government (Maniou & Photiou, 2017). As aforementioned, during June-July 2015, the neoliberal Cypriot government had more ideologically in common with most European leaders than the recently elected, left-wing Greek government. Perhaps ironically, for decades up to 2015, the right wing were also most vocal in highlighting their national identity as Greek (Philippou, 2009; Spyrou, 2001). It seems that when it was time to choose, the Cypriot government selected to promote the ideological, rather than the hellenocentric depiction of the Greek-Cypriot identity through the politically affiliated media. Perhaps needing to replace the loss of hellenocentrism in their discourse, or possibly to support (monetarily) the choice to criticize the Greek government, the four television channels, and the government policies they promoted, latently seemed to portray the need for a European aspect in the Cypriot identity, one of concordance and collaboration.

9.3   Resolution: The Evolving Cypriot Identity and the European Reality
The unprecedented conflict between (the right-wing) ideology and the burgeoning Hellenic nationalism of a significant portion of Greek-Cypriots was resolved by the eventual choice of the Greek government to return to the negotiations and remain within the Eurozone, a fact that is depicted positively in the news. However, the EU is found to be represented as split into two camps in the second round of negotiations: a harshly portrayed group, led by Germany and insisting on "Grexit", and a benignly depicted side, led by France, which wished Greece to resolve its economic crisis within and with the help of Europe. In fact, in introducing the story on the new round of negotiations on 12 July 2015, the presenter of *Sigma* commented, that "The Eurozone is split into two camps: France, Italy, Cyprus, the Commission and the European Parliament are all lobbying for a solution to be found. Germany and its satellites, comprising a block of seven countries, are insisting on their hard line" (Constantinou, 2015, 20:34:05). The use of manifestly militant language in the story has significant latent meanings. First, it allegorizes the negotiations as a battle (highlighting the conflict frame of "us versus them"); like all battles, there is a heroic side, namely the one now supporting the capitulated Greek government, and a villainous party, the one pushing for their own agenda. Second, the manifest support of various countries

for Greece allows the story to depict a benign faction of the EU, worth the loyalty of the audience as much because it adheres to the principle of collaboration the channels had been presenting as part of EU politics, as well as due to the fact that it implicitly justifies its Greek nationalism.

Not only do all channels report similarly the splitting of the EU in the second round of negotiations, but more importantly they all berate the "German side" for its unyielding line. Specifically, on 12 July 2015, the *Mega* presenter launches the story with "Germany is pushing for 'Grexit'… The only certainty is that Greece is with its back to the wall" (Symeou, 2015c,d 20:29:25, 20:34:44). These comments now begin to portray the Greek side as in need, so appealing once more, thereby generating antipathy for the German delegation. All channels delineate the "hard-liners" in Europe as "asking for humiliating compromises from Greece" (Pomylorides, 2015, 20:35:13) and depict these as being perceived by the Cypriot political powers as "unacceptable and provocative" (Potamitis, 2015, 20:47:05). The authors argue that the return of Greece to the negotiations has not only validated the hellenocentric sentiments of the Cypriot right-wing, but has enabled the television channels to enhance their perception and representation of the European identity with non-monolithic characteristics. Specifically, in the above examples, the EU is implicitly depicted as a dynamically shifting community of politics, in which there exist constant, frequently tense duels for power (between, but not limited to, the strongest economies), but a simultaneous desire for working out internal problems amicably. The latter portrayal serves to generate or enhance a European awareness in the Cypriot identity, which (being framed positively) the Greek-Cypriot audience is encouraged subtly to embrace.

In this work, it was contended that loyalty to political ideology was used by the Cypriot government and framed the news of the four nation-wide television channels in informing their evaluation of the positions of the Greek and European delegations. The political lens, however, seems to have played an integral part in framing the evaluation of the Greek crisis by the Cypriot political opposition as well. Specifically, on 28 June 2015, *Mega* reports the "accusations of the political opposition on the stance of the Cypriot government [against Greece]" during the first round of negotiations (Mavrou, 2015, 20:42:45). On 1 July 2015, *RIK* presents the demonstrations of various groups (e.g., small business owners, self-employed professionals, etc., most of which were either affiliated with the left ideology or had financial interests) in support of the Greek people and "against the austerity policies of Europe". The reportage is accompanied by, and ensconced in, pictorials of their slogans, such as, "We are not Euro-slaves" and "Greece-Cyprus one people" (Kanari, 2015. 20:35:08) that obviously derive from and serve to enhance their hellenocentric sentiments, as stated both explicitly as well as inferred by their denouncement of European practices. On 4 July 2015, both *RIK* and *Ant1* report a similar demonstration, organized by the opposition party itself, against the "demands and memorandums" of Europe and, as the *Ant1* reporter commented in the voice-over, "to exhibit solidarity for the people of Greece" (Adamou, 2015, 20:30:45). *AKEL* was not so vocal in emphasizing the Hellenic roots in the Cypriot identity before the summer of 2015, preferring to focus on the Cypriot ethnicity of

(all) citizens of the island republic (Philippou, 2009; Spyrou, 2001; see section 5). It is hard to believe that they had a sudden change of heart on this issue without other motives. Since the Greek government is also left, the authors argue that this change in their line was instigated by their allegiance to their own political ideology.

Reviewing the above discussions, the authors contend that the Cypriot national identity, fragmented between ideology and ethnic allegiance, was forced to budge from a decade-old stagnancy, and finally evolve during the extraordinary circumstances of the 2015 Greek crisis. Specifically, both the left and right parties were forced to select between their traditional adherence to their Hellenic and Cypriot roots and their ideological affiliation, and both chose the latter to inform their evaluation of the crisis. This illustrates that politics is (at least portrayed as) a more significant component in Cypriot identity-making than ethnic loyalties. Although this realization is not new, there are (not subtle) hints – in the positive representations of European delegations and the reporting of the negotiations – that Cypriots (and their political powers) are becoming more deeply aware of EU operation, even being encouraged by the media to embrace this new aspect, the European philosophy, in their grudgingly evolving identity. Whether this will lead to a real change in the perception of Cypriot identity remains to be seen in future, as this media trend is only just making its appearance in the television channels.

10.   CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This work explored the representation in the news of the Greek-Cypriot national channels of the culmination of the Greek economic and political crisis during June-July 2015, when the negotiations of the Greek government and their EU partners on the bailout of the Greek economy collapsed and a two-week period of social restlessness and political controversy ensued. Due to the broadness of the topic, the study focused on attempting to answer three key questions:

RQ1: How did the national channels depict the sides of the negotiations, i.e., the Greek delegation and the EU national delegations and institutions?
It was found that the television channels opted to display the Greek people as in dire financial need during the whole two-week period of the crisis, thereby generating a sympathetic side. The televised representations of the key players in the negotiations were initially generally neutral, and often appeared conflicting, despite journalistic attempts to place political blame for the collapse of the negotiations, speaking to a confusion in identifying the "villainous" camp(s). After the first few days, however, the left Greek government gradually emerged as non-collaborative, even combatant, in its initial interactions with European delegates. Conversely, the latter were also (for the most part) portrayed as willing to collaborate in trying to solve the Greek financial problem within and with the help of the multinational and multicultural union. These representations, therefore, resulted in the news being imbued with a frame of "us versus them" and generating sympathy for the Greek people as well as a more complex understanding of European politics. The right-wing affiliated television channels

possibly chose (consciously or subconsciously) these representations, following the lead of the neoliberal Cypriot government, which had more ideological common ground with most European leaders rather than the Greek delegation, and which was also depicted as eager to collaborate in "bailing out" the Greek economy.

RQ2: Which of the characteristic(s) of the Cypriot national identity – ideological, nationalistic or European – were drawn upon or promoted in the news stories?
As a significant number of Greek-Cypriots take pride in their Hellenic origins and consider them a vital aspect of their identity, the choice to represent the Greek government as "them" is counter-intuitive for two reasons. First, it risks alienating the audience. Second, the Cypriot government party *DISI*, and in general the political center and right-wing were most emphatically hellenocentric in their discourse for decades. These tendencies explain why the frame of "us versus them" did not immediately appear in the portrayals of the news; in fact, it took the better part of the first week to assign the blame for the failure of the negotiations.

Nevertheless, this sudden shift is conspicuous. The authors have argued that the political affiliation of the television channels has colored the representations of both the negotiations of Greece with the EU, specifically because the government of Greece was left-wing, while most European leaders were neoliberal. It seems that ideological loyalties constitute an underlying, but vital, component in national identity, in this case, the Cypriot identity. This conclusion is supported by the shift in the political stance of the left-wing opposition party as well, since up to the summer of 2015, *AKEL* had placed considerable importance on the Cypriot roots of all the inhabitants of the island, but during this period, it took a calculated, hellenocentric approach in its communication. Consequently, this work identifies that politics has a stronger influence on the Cypriot national identity than ethnic loyalties.

RQ3: Based on these representations, is the portrayal of the Cypriot national identity evolving? If so, how?
In this case study, a trend was also identified in promoting a new, European awareness in the Cypriot identity, both by the television channels and as portrayed by the Cypriot government. Specifically, the initial depiction of European institutions and delegations as part of the "us" side, i.e., benign and seeking only effective cooperation, as well as the portrayal of a Europe split over the Greek bailout in the second round of negotiations, generate appreciation of and sympathy for this complex community of rival politics and opportunity. Although this trend cannot (yet?) be considered a conspicuous evolution in the televised portrayal of the Cypriot national identity, it can be considered a shock to traditional, ethnic positions on identity-making.

The authors are not claiming that there is now or even that there will be in future, any broad-based support for a European nation in Cyprus. After all, Europeans have only been interacting in large numbers for a few decades. However, demography seems to be working in favor of endorsing an overarching EU identity, as young people are more likely to know second languages, become educated and travel, which makes them more open to accepting a European component to their identity. As older generations pass on, there may be more people who think of themselves as Europeans (Fligstein et al., 2012, p.119).

This study has demonstrated that television news plays a crucial role in upholding as well as jolting national identity within the EU. The identity depicted here tends to favor a more "European-friendly" profile, in addition to the existing national identity. Crises may constitute the cause in which specific characteristics of this newly arising aspect of identity-making emerge for the public, while television may embody the "vehicle" through which it becomes accessible.

Therefore, the framing of the news in national media, especially television, in every country plays a key role in this future, since it can reinforce the image of a concrete European identity, while preserving and depicting national identities in the (admittedly) grudgingly positive delineation of the European aspect in Cypriot identity. It would be an interesting future project to investigate whether such media representations do affect the positive outlook of the Cypriot public towards their European reality. This could be accomplished through quantitative framing analysis and interviews with journalists regarding their framing selections.

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